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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah ;
Corporation,
]
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

]
]
)

Court of Appeals No. 20090166

MARMALADE SQUARE
;
CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS ;
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation,;
BRUCE MANKA and FRANK
;
GUYMAN
;
Defendants/Appellants. ]

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT
The Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78A-4-103(2)0) (2009) and Utah R. App.
P. 5.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The sole issue presented for consideration by this appeal is whether the trial
court committed reversible error in granting the Plaintiffs motion to set aside its
default after the Appellee and its lawyer failed to appear for the scheduled trial in
the matter.

1

Although "a trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a
default judgment," that "discretion is not unlimited." Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277
(Utah 2000). The Utah Supreme Court will overturn a trial court's decision to set
aside a default if it has abused its discretion. See id.
As a threshold matter, a trial court's ruling must be 'based on adequate
findings of fact1 and 'on the law.'" Id. (quoting May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109,
1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)). While the trial court should exercise its discretion
"in furtherance of justice and should incline towards granting relief in a doubtful
case to the end that the party may have a hearing," Helgesen v. Inyangumia, 636
P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981), "[a] decision premised on flawed legal conclusions . .
. constitutes an abuse of discretion." Lund, supra at 277. In the context of a denial
of a rule 60(b) motion, the Court reviews " . . . a district court's findings of fact
under a clear eirror standard of review." Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480 (Utah
2006) (citing Chen v. Stewart, 123 P.3d 416 (Utah 2005)).

The trial court's

conclusions of law, however, are reviewed under a "correctness" standard which
affords the trial court no deference," id. (citing Richins v. Delbert Chipman & Sons
Co., 817 P.2d 382, 385 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)).
Rule 60(b) allows a court "upon such terms as are just" and "in the
furtherance of justice" to relieve a party from a judgment for "mistake,
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inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . or . . . any other reason justifying
relief/' Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Presumably, Plaintiffs theory before the trial court
was essentially one of excusable neglect. To demonstrate that the default was due to
excusable neglect, f[t]he movant must show that he has used due diligence and that
he was prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.f"
Black's Title, Inc. v. Utah State Ins. Dep't., 991 P.2d 607 (UT. App 1999) (quoting
Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973))
(alteration in original). "In the absence of such a showing, [a defaulting party]fs
assertion does not demonstrate his neglect was excusable.ff Id.
The Defendants preserved the issue as demonstrated by their Memorandum
in Opposition to the Motion to Set Aside (R. 384-389).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OR STATUTES
There are no determinative constitutional or statutory provisions upon which
Appellants rely. Rather, the issue raised in this matter is governed by Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b) and interpreting case law.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case.
The Plaintiff/Appellee filed this action seeking to obtain a judgment against
the Defendants for drain and line cleaning services it rendered (R. 1-11).
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Defendants have maintained throughout the proceedings that they are not
responsible

for

charges related

to the Plaintiff/Appellee's

services. See

Defendant/Appellants5 Motion to Dismiss (R. 42-52); Defendant/Appellants'
Second Motion to Dismiss (R. 68-81); Defendant/Appellants' Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 133-155, 164-171); and, Defendant/Appellants' Motion to Dismiss
Second Amended Complaint (R. 218-237).
B.

Course of Proceedings Below.

The Complaint in this case was filed on January 19, 2005 (R. 1). The Record
is replete with motions to dismiss and for summary judgment filed by the
Defendants/Appellants. Id. The Plaintiff, in an effort to combat the grounds for
dismissal and summary judgment urged by the Defendants/Appellants, has
amended its Complaint twice R. 107-08, 188-194). The Court has awarded attorney
fees to the Defendants/Appellants based upon the Plaintiffs conduct (R. 195-96).
Ultimately, on July 8, 2008, the case was set for pretrial on July 22, 2008 (R.
325-26). At the time of the Pretrial Conference, the case was set for a bench trial on
October 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 328). However, the Notice of Bench Trial that
was sent to counsel by the trial court, on July 22, 2008, set the trial date for
November 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. (R. 333-335). The Court docket will reflect that on
July 25, 2008, the Court sent a Corrected Notice of Bench Trial to counsel changing
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the trial date back to October 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m., the date established at the time
of the Pretrial Conference (R. 337-39).
On July 29, 2008, as a result of a conference call with the Court and both
counsel, the trial date was changed to October 28, 2008, at 9:30 a.m., a date and
time accepted by both counsel (340-41).
Both parties filed witness and exhibit designations as ordered by the trial
court in preparation for trial (R. 350-55, 356-65). On the morning of trial, October
28, 2008, the Defendants/Appellants with counsel appeared. The Plaintiff and its
counsel did not. The trial court then authorized the entry of the Plaintiffs default.
However, the clerk mistakenly indicated in the minutes of the bench trial that it was
the Defendants that did not appear (R. 366).
The Defendants/Appellants filed a motion with supporting memorandum and
affidavit to correct the entry of default on October 30, 2008 (R. 367-71, 374-83).
The Plaintiff/Appellee filed a two-page motion to set aside the default and set a new
trial date on November 3, 2008 (R. 372-373). The Defendants/Appellants filed a
memorandum in opposition to the Plaintiff/Appellee's motion to set aside the
default (R. 384-89). The Plaintiff did not file a memorandum in support of its
motion to set aside the default or in opposition to the Defendants motion to correct
the default.

5

C.

Disposition of the Trial Court

Although the trial court signed an Order correcting the minutes of the bench
trial and entering the default of the Plaintiff/Appellee (R. 398-99), the trial court
negated the effect of that Order and set aside the Plaintiffs default by Minute Entry
dated February 4, 2009. The Minute Entry did not contain any findings of fact or
underlying reasoning explaining the basis of the trial court's action (400-401). It is
from that Order and Minute Entry that the Defendants/Appellants sought
interlocutory appeal (R. 405-06).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Plaintiff initiated this action on January 19, 2005, more than four

years ago, to obtain judgment against the Defendants for drain and line cleaning
services that it provided in and around the Marmalade Square Condominium
Development, located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah (R. 1-11).
2.

The Defendants have vehemently denied responsibility for the charges

associated with the services because a) the charges for the services of the Plaintiff
were the responsibility of individual condominium owners not named in the action;
b) the corporate entities sued by the Plaintiff in this case did not exist when the
services were allegedly performed and are not responsible therefore; c) the person
ordering and signing for the Plaintiffs services was not an agent or employee of
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any of the Defendants; and d) most of the Plaintiffs invoices fail to identify the
Marmalade condominiums as the area of service. See Defendant/Appellants'
Motion to Dismiss (R. 42-52); Defendant/Appellants' Second Motion to Dismiss
(R. 68-81); Defendant/Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment (R. 133-155,
164-171); and, Defendant/Appellants' Motion to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint (R. 218-237).
3.

On July 8, 2008, the trial court set the matter for pretrial conference on

July 22, 2008 (R. 325-26). At the time of the Pretrial Conference, counsel for both
parties appeared and the case was set for a bench trial on October 14, 2008 at 9:30
a.m. (R. 328). However, the Notice of Bench Trial that was sent to counsel by the
trial court on July 22, 2008, erroneously set the trial date for November 14, 2008 at
9:30 a m (R. 333-335).
4.

The Court docket reflects that on July 25, 2008, the Court sent a

Corrected Notice of Bench Trial to counsel changing the trial date back to October
14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m., the date established at the time of the Pretrial Conference (R.
337-39).
5.

On July 29, 2008, as a result of a conference call with the Court and

both counsel, the trial date was changed to October 28, 2008, at 9:30 a.m., a date
and time accepted by both counsel. A Notice of Rescheduled Bench Trial was then
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sent to counsel on that same day, July 29, 2008 (R. 340-41, Addendum, Exhibit
"A"). The Notice setting the matter for trial on October 28, 2008, was sent to the
correct addresses for counsel and explicitly provided therein that nonappearance at
trial could result in the entry of default of the non-appearing party. Id.
6.

Both parties filed witness and exhibit designations as ordered by the

trial court in preparation for trial (R. 350-55, 356-65).
7.

On the morning of trial, October 28, 2008, at 9:30 a.m., the

Defendants/Appellants, with counsel, appeared early, ready for trial. The judge set
to try this case, Judge Robert P. Faust, was hearing another matter when the
Defendants and their counsel arrived. Judge Faust waited fifteen minutes after the
time set for trial, 9:30 a.m., and still, the Plaintiff and its counsel did not appear.
8.

The trial court then authorized the entry of the Plaintiffs default based

upon the nonappearance at trial and further authorized attorney fees attendant to the
defense of the Plaintiffs action. However, when the clerk created the minutes of
the scheduled bench trial, she mistakenly indicated that it was the Defendants
instead of the Plaintiffs that did not appear at trial (R. 366, Addendum, Exhibit
"B").
9.

The

Defendants/Appellants

immediately

filed

a motion

with

supporting memorandum and affidavit to correct the erroneous entry of Defendants'
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default and authorize the entry of the Plaintiffs default.

The motion with

supporting memorandum and affidavit was filed on October 30, 2008 (R. 367-71,
374-83, Addendum, Exhibit "C").
10.

The Plaintiff/Appellee, on November 3, 2008, filed a two-page motion

to set aside the Plaintiffs default and set a new trial date (R. 372-373, Addendum,
Exhibit "D" ). In the Motion, counsel for the Plaintiff asserted that he believed the
trial date was November 14, 2008 instead of October 28, 2008. Id.

However,

counsel for the Plaintiff, in his motion, did not deny that he was privy to the
conference call with the court and other counsel on July 29, 2008, setting the
October 28, 2008 trial date. Further Plaintiffs counsel did not deny receiving thei
Notice of Rescheduled Bench Trial, setting the October 28, 2008 trial date <R. 340).
Finally, the motion of the Plaintiff was unaccompanied by a memorandum, affidavit
or other verified pleading. Id.
11.

In the Affidavit submitted by counsel for Defendants/Appellants,

counsel for the Defendants very carefully, under oath, recited the events that had
resulted in the setting of the October 28 trial date, the events that transpired on the
day of trial including the time that the trial court and counsel waited for the Plaintiff
and the eventual order of the trial court for entry of default and authorizing of
attorney fees (R. 374-81, Addendum Exhibit "C").
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12.

The Defendants/Appellants filed a memorandum in opposition to the

Plaintiffs motion to set aside the default authorized by the trial court (R. 364-89,
Addendum Exhibit "E"). In the memorandum the Defendants/Appellants explicitly
outlined all the deficiencies of the Plaintiffs motion. Id.
13.

Plaintiff did not file, in response to the Defendants5 memorandum, any

additional pleading supplementing its motion, such as a memorandum addressing
the legal basis and adequacy of the Plaintiffs motion, an affidavit attesting to the
factual basis of the motion, or any other evidence to support the motion.
14.

On December 22, 2008, Judge Faust signed the Order Correcting Entry

of Default, prepared by counsel for the Defendants (R. 398-399, Addendum Exhibit
"F"). In relevant part, the Order stated:
1.

The Court hereby relieves the Defendant from the default
entered on October 28, 2008 against the Defendants.

2.

The Court hereby enters the default of the Plaintiff, who failed
to appear for trial on October 28, 2008.

Id.
15.

Then on February 4, 2009, Judge Faust signed a Minute Entry that

provided:
This case came before the court for consideration of Defendant's
Motion for Correction of Entry of Default and Plaintiffs Motion to Set
Aside Default and Set New Trial Date. After review of the file and
pleadings therein, the court rules that the default of any party
previously entered is hereby set aside. The clerk is directed to set this
case for a Pretrial Conference, so that settlement discussions may be
10

affected and/or a mutually acceptable date for a Bench Trial may be
set. This minute entry is the order of the court on this issue; no further
order is required.
R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit "G".
16*

Defendants/Appellants then filed their Petition seeking permission to

Appeal from Judge Faust's February 4, 2009 Minute Entry (R. 405-06).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Defendants/Appellants contend that the signed Minute Entry of February
4, 2009 (R. 400, Addendum, Exhibit "G") setting aside the default of the Plaintiff in
this case constituted an abuse of discretion. Appellants submit that they are entitled
to have the ruling encompassed in the Minute Entry setting aside the Plaintiffs
default, reversed and the matter remanded to the district court for the assessment of
attorney fees and costs.
The action taken by Judge Faust in signing the Minute Entry of February 4,
2009, constituted an abuse of discretion because first, the submission by the
Plaintiff was deficient because it did not comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 7. The
motion was filed without a memorandum and did not state a legal basis for the relief
requested.
Second, in contravention of Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) and the standard
established by the Utah Supreme Court in Erickson v. Schenkers, 882 P.2d 1147
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(Utah 1994), the Plaintiff/Appellee did not establish a basis for relief under the Rule
(mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect).1 The Plaintiff failed to submit any
evidence by way of verified pleading or affidavit that would even commence a Rule
60(b) examination. Further, the explanation given by Plaintiff for nonappearance
does not meet the well-defined definition of mistake, inadvertence or excusable
neglect. Specifically, the Plaintiff failed to demonstrate due diligence in
establishing a Paile 60(b) basis.
Third, an examination of case law establishes that the facts set out in the
Plaintiffs motion are deficient as a matter of law under the Rule 60(b) standard.
Fourth, the ruling of the trial court setting aside the default was deficient
because it did not include the requisite findings of fact and conclusions of law that
demonstrated conformity with the legal standard for evaluating a Rule 60(b)
motion. Additionally, Rule 60(a) did not provide a basis for setting aside the default
of the Plaintiff.
Lastly, the Defendants/Appellants are entitled to have this case remanded for
the assessment of attorney fees and costs reasonably in the defense of this matter
and on appeal.
1

The Plaintiff, in its Motion to Set Aside the Default (R. 372-73), never cited a legal
basis for its motion. Appellants have assumed throughout the proceeding that the
Plaintiff was filing under Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Appellants filed their memorandum
in opposition to Plaintiffs motion based upon Rule 60(b) and the Plaintiff failed to
file any further pleading identifying a different legal basis.
12

ARGUMENT
POINT I: THE PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR RULE 60(b)
RELIEF IS DEFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
The motion of the Plaintiff, seeking relief from the default was deficient as a
matter of law because it failed to conform with any of the legal requirements
attendant to the request.
A.

The Plaintiffs Application for Relief Violated Utah R. Civ.
P. 7.

In relevant part, Utah R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1) states:
An application to the court for an order shall be by motion which,
unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion
shall be in writing and state succinctly and with particularity the
relief sought and the grounds for the relief sought. (Emphasis
added)
Id.
The Plaintiffs motion is completely devoid of any explanation of the legal
basis or grounds upon which the Plaintiff relied. Further, Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(1)
clearly requires a motion seeking to set aside a default to be accompanied by a
supporting memorandum. Plaintiff failed to supply a supporting memorandum of
any kind explaining the legal basis for the relief requested.
In Holton v. Holton, 243 P.2d 438 (Utah 1952), the Utah Supreme Court held
that although the rules of civil procedure ". . . were intended to provide liberality in
13

procedure, it is nevertheless expected that they will be followed, and unless reasons
satisfactory to the court are advanced as a basis for relief from complying with
them, parties will not be excused from so doing. . . It is only when a showing is
made that some inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or mistake has occurred
and that substantial injustice will be done, that a party will be relieved from failure
to comply with the rules." Id.
The Rules of Procedure are to be interpreted in a manner to do substantial
justice. Utah R. Civ. P. 8(f). However, the serving up of a request for relief that
fails to inform other counsel and the court of the factual and legal basis therefore
should not be tolerated. In this case, there was no supporting memorandum or
affidavit that would fill in the blanks left by the motion. The pleading left all the
work for the Defendants to try and figure out the basis of the motion and then
respond thereto. Even after the inadequacy of the motion was pointed out, the
Plaintiff failed to supplement the motion to provide the required factual and legal
basis. Defendants submit that the complete failure to comply with Rule 7 should
meet with a sanction. If the party requesting the relief does not put the work into
the project to supply a legal basis, there should be no requirement for the other
party and the court to respond thereto.
B.

The Plaintiffs Motion Failed to Provide the Court with a
Legal or Factual Basis for Relief.
14

The explanation provided in the Plaintiffs motion for the nonappearance at
trial was, "[t]he Plaintiff believed the trial was set for November 14, 2008" (R.
372). The statement contained in the motion was not supported by an affidavit or
verified pleading. The pleading did not cite a theory, rule or legal basis upon which
the request was based. Utah R. Civ. P. 43(b) states:
(b) Evidence on motions. When a motion is based on facts not
appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits
presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct that
the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
depositions. (Emphasis added)
Id.
One can analogize to the disposition of a motion for summary judgment.
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Rule
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or by
submission of deposition testimony or other verified pleading, must set forth
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Cowen and Co. v. Atlas
Stock Transfer Co., 695 P.2d 109 (Utah 1984); see also Brigham Truck &
Implement Co. v. Fridal 746 P.2d 1171, 1173 (Utah 1987) ("[B]are contentions,
unsupported by any specifications of facts in support thereof, raise no material
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questions of fact."); Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBar gains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858 (Utah
2008).
The bare allegation that the Plaintiff thought the trial was on another day is
simply insufficient as a matter of law to even create a Rule 60(b) issue. Certainly,
after the Defendants/Appellants supplied a memorandum in opposition to the
Plaintiffs motion and an Affidavit carefully setting out how the trial date was
arrived at and noticed by the Court, the bare allegation of the Plaintiff did not create
a justiciable issue of fact (R. 374-81).
Of course, there are a number of major facts that the bare allegation in the
Plaintiffs motion does not address. First, was it the Plaintiff or his counsel that
thought the trial was on another date? Second, does counsel for the Plaintiff dispute
that he received the Notice from the trial court setting the trial date? Third, does
counsel for the Plaintiff deny there was a telephone conference with other counsel
and the court wherein the date for the trial was arrived at? Fourth, what facts are
there that the Plaintiff acted with due diligence in recording the trial date, checking
the calendar, informing the client, etc. Defendant would submit that if counsel for
the Plaintiff was acting with due diligence, he would have sent the notice of trial to
his client and calendared the date in his calendaring system. It is hard to understand
how both the lawyer's office and the client could have missed the date if that simple
16

process of mailing the notice of trial was followed. However, because there was no
evidence of due diligence submitted, there is no way to evaluate that critical issue.
Defendants/Appellants submit that the motion of the Plaintiff/Appellee was
insufficient as a matter of law to constitute a claim for relief under Rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, the trial court did not have a legal or
factual basis upon which he could exercise his discretion and relieve the Plaintiff
from the default.
POINT II: THE ALLEGATION CONTAINED IN THE
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION WAS INSUFFICIENT UNDER
RULE 60(b)
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in relevant part as
follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. . . . The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2),
or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding
was entered or taken. . . The procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action. (Emphasis added)
Id.

17

As established by the Utah Supreme Court in Erickson v. Schenkers, 882
P.2d 1147 (Utah 1994), in order to prevail on a motion to set aside a default
judgment, the moving party must establish 1) that the motion seeking relief was
timely filed (within three months); 2) that a basis for the relief has been established
under the Rule (mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect); and 3) that the party
against whom the default has been entered has a meritorious defense on the merits.
Id. See also, Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.3d 664 (Utah App. 2004); Black's Title,
Inc., 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999); and Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000).
If the Court finds that the Plaintiff/Appellee's motion was legally sufficient,
there is no question that it was filed within three months of the entry of default.
Additionally, since the Defendants/Appellants' multiple motions to dismiss and for
summary judgment had been denied by the trial court, it must be assumed that the
third element of having a prima facie case had been met for purposes of a Rule
60(b) motion.
Therefore, in determining the legal sufficiency of the Plaintiff/Appellee's
motion, the Court must decide whether the stated ground contained in the Plaintiffs
motion constitutes a basis for relief under the rule. In the two-page motion, the
Plaintiff states:
The Plaintiff believed that the trial date was November 14, 2008, and
has prepared for that date. It appears that the trial date was originally
18

set for November 14, 2008, and then changed to October 14, 2008 and
then changed again to October 28, 2008. The Plaintiff believed the trial
was set for November 14, 2008. . ..
R. 372-73, Addendum Exhibit "D"
As recited above, there are no affidavits or other verified pleadings that
establish the circumstances surrounding the missing of the trial date. We do not
know if Plaintiffs counsel recorded the trial date when it was set during the
conference call with the court. We do not know if counsel recorded the trial date
when the written notice from the court was received. We do not know if counsel
sent a copy of the trial notice to his client. We do not know when counsel and his
client met for trial preparation and how both the client and the lawyer could have
been confused if they both had the written notice of the court.
It is the Defendant's contention that given the facts in this case, the Plaintiff
cannot make out a case for mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect in missing
the trial because the Defendant failed to submit evidence of the circumstances
attendant thereto. The facts are that the change of the trial date was done with the
trial court and counsel in a telephone conference. An appropriate notice was sent to
counsel thereafter and if the notice was recorded in the due course of business and
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sent to the client, it would be utterly impossible for both the lawyer and client to
miss the trial date.
A.

The Plaintiff has not Established Mistake, Inadvertence,
Surprise, or Excusable Neglect.

The case law is clear. It is not sufficient for a party or the lawyer, acting for
the party, to simply claim that he did not appear at a trial because he had
erroneously concluded that the trial was to be held on another day. The Utah Court
of Appeals has held that "[t]o demonstrate that the default was due to excusable
neglect, '[t]he movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was
prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.1'1 Black's
Title, Inc., supra, 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting Airkem Intermountain,
Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)) (alteration in original). In
fact, the Utah Supreme Court has defined "excusable neglect" as "the exercise of
f

due diligence1 by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini

Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) (citing Airkem
Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)).
In fact, in Interstate Excavating v. Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah
1980), the Utah Supreme Court gave a thorough explanation of excusable neglect
and due diligence:
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This Court has previously stated that neglect, to be excusable, must
occur despite the exercise of due diligence. Airkem Intermountain, Inc.
v. Parker, supra, footnote 5. Other jurisdictions have defined
excusable neglect as "such as might have been the act of a reasonably
prudent person under the same circumstances." Kromm v. Kromm, 191
P.2d 115 (Cal App. 1948). It has also been held that simple
carelessness does not rise to the statutory standard, Doyle v. Rice
Ranch Oil Co., 81 P.2d 980 (Cal App. 1938), nor do simple business
difficulties which allegedly prevent the dedication of adequate
attention to the litigation in question. Usery v. Weiner Bros., Inc., 70
F.R.D. 615 (D.C. 1976). Moreover, this Court has held that the failure
of a party to appear in court, allegedly occasioned by failure of notice
due to withdrawal of counsel, does not constitute such "excusable
neglect" as to justify relief from judgment.... [citing case].
Id.
Because there is no evidence of due diligence, the simple fact that a party
thought that trial was on another day, does not make out a Rule 60(b) case. A Party
must show all that he or she did that could constitute due diligence and then claim
that in spite of reasonable care and due diligence, the trial date was missed. In this
case, the Plaintiff utterly failed to provide any proof of reasonable care or due
diligence.
B.

The Allegation in Plaintiffs Motion is Insufficient Under the
Facts Presented in Other Cases Decided by the Utah
Appellate Courts.

In Allred v. Allred, 2005 UT App 338 (2005), the district court entered
judgment against the defendant after he failed to appear at the scheduled trial and
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denied his motion for a new trial and for relief from judgment under Utah R. Civ. P.
59 and 60. Id. The Utah Appellate Court found that the district court mailed
defendant a "notice of trial" which was signed by the district court judge. The notice
timely and adequately described the nature of the proceedings against him. The
Court of Appeals found that the district court's finding that defendant did not act
with ordinary prudence or as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable
neglect was well supported. Id.
In Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573 (1962), "the
[defendant's] attorney thought he had filed an answer b u t . . . he had mistakenly not
done so." Id. at 573. The Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in granting a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff when the
evidence was that "the attorney then representing the plaintiff called the defendant's
attorney's attention to the fact that the matter was in default and that a default
judgment would be taken unless something was done." Id.; see also Pacer Sport &
Cycle, Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1975) (finding no excusable neglect
under rule 60 where defendant "assumed the action had been taken care of and
therefore took no steps to file an answer to the complaint").
As noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has defined "excusable neglect" as
"the exercise of 'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar
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circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah
1987) (citing Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429,
431 (1973)). The Record in this case is entirely empty as to the Plaintiffs exercise
of reasonable care and due diligence. There were simply no facts that could have
been construed in favor of the Plaintiffs position that demonstrated that the
Plaintiff and his lawyer took reasonable and ordinary steps to calendar the trial
setting, circulate the notice thereof to the client and witnesses, met to prepare for
trial, and then, in spite of efforts demonstrating reasonable care and due diligence,
somehow missed the trial date.
POINT III: THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR IN
FAILING TO ENTER FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
As noted in Hunt v. Hunt, 2004 UT App 2 (Ut Ct. App. 2004), "a trial court
has broad discretion in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment." Lund v.
Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000) (per curiam). However, a trial court's discretion is
not limitless and "must be based on adequate findings of factf and on the law.'" Id.
(quoting May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam)).
Likewise, in Davis v. Goldsworthy , 184 P.3d 626 (Ut. Ct. App. 2008), the Court
stated that while a trial court has considerable discretion with regard to Rule 60,
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"[a] decision premised on flawed legal conclusions . . . constitutes an abuse of
discretion." Lund, supra.
Of course, in this case, there is nothing in Judge Faust's signed Minute Entry
of February 4, 2009, that reveals his thought process in deciding to set aside the
default of the Plaintiff that was entered on December 22, 2008, barely two months
before (R. 398-399. 400). Accordingly, the decision does not conform with the
requirements established by this Court requiring sufficient findings and conclusions
so that the decision process is clear on review. Based thereon, the ruling constituted
an abuse of discretion warranting reversal.
However, the Defendants/Appellants contend that the Plaintiffs motion for
relief is defective as a matter of law and therefore could not be used by the trial
court to grant relief under Rule 60(b). The Plaintiff simply failed to provide the
trial court with evidence of reasonable care and due process. Therefore the simple
conclusion that the party was mistaken as to the trial date is insufficient as a matter
of law.
Accordingly, Defendants request that this Court so rule that although the
decision of the trial court was defective based upon the absence of findings, there
was no record upon which an order relieving the Plaintiff from default could have
been fashioned.

There is one additional issue that should be addressed and that is
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the inherent right of the trial court to correct clerical mistakes pursuant to Utah R.
Civ. P. 60(a). The Rule provides:
Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts
of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the
motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.
During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected
before the appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter
while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the
appellate court.
Id.
In Lindsay v. Atkin, 680 P.2d 401 (Utah 1984), the question addressed on appeal
was whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying a motion to correct its
earlier order "nunc pro tunc." The order dismissed a defendant, from the lawsuit
"with prejudice," and defendant sought a change to reflect a dismissal "without
prejudice." The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's order refusing to correct
the earlier order. Id.
The appellants sought relief pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 60(a). The Court
started its analysis by noting the between clerical errors and judicial errors, stating:
The distinction between a judicial error and a clerical error does not
depend upon who made it. Rather, it depends on whether it was made
in rendering the judgment or in recording the judgment as rendered. 46
Am. Jur. 2d Judgments § 202. Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314,
317, 471 P.2d 143, 145 (1970) (emphasis added).
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The Court continued and stated that the ". . . correction contemplated by Rule
60(a) must be undertaken for the purpose of reflecting the actual intention of the
court and parties. 6A Moore's Federal Practice para. 60.60[1] (2d ed. 1983)." Id.
The Court held that Rule 60(a) is not intended to correct errors of a substantial
nature, particularly where the claim of error is unilateral. The fact that an intention
was subsequently found to be mistaken would not cause the mistake to be
"clerical" See Bershad v. McDonough, 469 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1972).
The Court concluded:
In the instant case, the error complained of may not be characterized as
"clerical." The court may have erred in granting Parrish Oil Tools a
dismissal with prejudice, but the appropriate remedy was a timely
motion to amend and/or a timely appeal to this Court.
Id.
Defendants/Appellants submit that the setting aside of the Plaintiffs default
was not clerical but was in response to the Plaintiffs motion. As such, a decision
thereon had to be undertaken within the parameters of Rule 60(b) as discussed
above. Because the trial court was not supplied sufficient evidence upon which to
grant the Plaintiff relief, the setting aside of the default was an abuse of discretion
regardless of the existence of findings and conclusions.
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POINT IV: THE DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS INCLUDING FEES INCURRED ON
APPEAL
If this Court reverses the Trial Court's Minute Entry, the default of the
Plaintiff will be reinstated and the litigation will be concluded with the exception of
the issue of attorney fees. At the time set for trial in this case, the trial court, in
addition to authorizing the default of the Plaintiff, also authorized the award of
attorney fees (See R. 391-395, 375 (para. 13)). With the setting aside of the default,
the issue of attorney fees was not decided.
Defendants/Appellants request an order of this Court awarding attorney fees
and costs on appeal and either an order awarding the fees requested in the trial court
(R. 391-95) or an order remanding the case to the district court for the assessment
of attorney fees and costs.
The Plaintiff has throughout the proceeding, sought attorney fees based upon
the language contained on the invoices (R. 2, para.8; 189, para. 10).

The

Defendants have likewise, throughout the proceeding, sought attorney fees based
upon the "reciprocal attorney fee" provision contained in the Code (R. 64-65,
Seventh Defense).
Utah Code Annotated 78B-5-826 (2005 as Amended) provides as follows:
Attorney fees — Reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees.
A court may award costs and attorney fees to either party that prevails
in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, or
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other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one
party to recover attorney fees.
Id.
Of course, the purpose of the section is to level the playing field by allowing
either party to recover fees when only one party may assert such a right under a
contract, remedying the unequal allocation of litigation risks built into many
contracts. In addition, this statute rectifies the inequitable common-law result in
which a party seeking to enforce a contract containing an attorney fees clause has a
significant bargaining advantage over a party that seeks to invalidate the contract.
Bilanzich v. Lonetti, 160 P.3d 1041 Utah 2007).
Illustrating the concept is Myrah v. Campbell, 163 P.3d 679 (UT App 2007)
In that case by a landlord against tenants for breach of the rental agreement, the
agreement provided that only the landlord could recover attorney fees. However,
because the Code established reciprocal rights to recover attorney fees based on a
written contract and because the tenants defeated some of the landlord's claims, the
case was remanded to the trial court to determine the appropriate award of attorney
fees. Id.
Given the equities of this case that include the Plaintiffs nonappearance at
trial that subjected the Defendants to significant un-needed expense and the
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Plaintiffs failure to comply with even the rudimentary basics of a Rule 60(b)
application, subjecting the Defendants to significant post-decision and appeal
expense, Defendants submit that an award of fees and costs both at the trial court
and appeal level is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the total absence of any facts that would demonstrate a basis
under Rule 60(b), it is respectfully submitted that the trial court's Minute Entry of
February 4, 2009 should be reversed and the case remanded for assessment of fees
and costs at both the trial and appellate levels.
DATED this Z(/day of May, 2009.

Sarah Hardy, Esq.
/
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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mird Judicial District
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SALTUKHCOUNTV
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NOTICE OF f£&ae>H-&t>OU&b>
BENCH TRIAL

CHEAP O ROOTER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No: 050901063 DC

MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM H,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

JUDGE COLLECTION
July 29,2008

BENCH TRIAL.
Date: 10/28/2008
Time: 09:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N41
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
450 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JUDGE COLLECTION
The reason for the change is Court Ordered
THIS BENCH TRIAL WILL NOT BE CONTINUED WITHOUT THE WRITTEN
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AND/OR WITHOUT THE JUDGE'S APPROVAL.
UNAVAILABILITY OR NON-APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL OR PARTIES MAY RESULT
IN DATES BEING SET WITHOUT COUNSEL'S INPUT, PLEADINGS MAY BE
STRICKEN, COMPLAINT DISMISSED OR A DEFAULT ENTERED.
Please call Carol @ 238-7388 with any scheduling conflicts. The
responsibility of contacting the other party(ies) is that of the
party requesting the change.
Dated t h i s

day
Tsh.

20 Cft?.

of

Distri
Court's Notice of RESCHEDULED Bench Trial (

VD26842562

050901063

pages:

MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOf

Page 1

Case No: 050901063
Date:
Jul 29, 2008
The Court will provide interpreters for criminal cases and domestic
violence cases involving protective orders or stalking injunctions.
(Fees in criminal cases may be imposed at the judge's discretion.)
IF YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CASE PLEASE NOTIFY THE COURT at 238-7338 (five days before.the
hearing, if possible).
FOR ALL OTHER CASES, you must bring someone with you to
interpret. If you do not know someone who can help you, the names
of court interpreters you can hire are listed on the courts'
website athttp://www.utcourts.gov/resources/interp/certified.html.
If you do not have access to the internet, ask the court clerk to
print off a copy of this list for you.
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) should call Third District Court-Salt Lake at
238-7500 at least three working days prior to the proceeding. (For
TTY service call Utah Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711)

Page 2

Case No: 050901063
Date:
Jul 29, 2008
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 050901063 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD

NAME

Mail

DENNIS L MANGRUM
Attorney PLA
7110 HIGHLAND DR
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121
SARAH H YOUNG
Attorney DEF
1781 SIDEWINDER DR STE 200
PARK CITY UT 84060

Mail

Dated t h i s <%0 day of

5
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, 2O_0&
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHEAP 0 ROOTER,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
BENCH TRIAL

vs.

Case No: 050901063 DC

MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM H,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

ROBERT FAUST
October 28, 2008

patj

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): DENNIS L MANGRUM
Video
Tape Count: 9.3 0

TRIAL
COUNT: 9.30
This case is before the court for trial.
Defts did not appear.
The court enters the default of Marmalade Square Condominium.

Page 1 (last)
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Sarah H.Young (11301)
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
Attorneys for Defendant
5532 Lillehammer, Ste. 104
Park City, Utah 84098
Telephone: (435)649-7369
Facsimile: (435) 649-0246
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

MOTION FOR URCP 60(a)
CORRECTION OF ENTRY OF
DEFAULT

MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant.

Case No. 050901063
Judge Collection

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Marmalade Square Condominium Homeowners
Association, by and through counsel, Sarah H. Young of Young, Kester and Petro, and moves
the Court for a Correction of the Minute Entry, entered on October 28 th , 2008 by this Court
pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a). In support thereof, the Defendant has filed a
Memorandum in Support hereof, filed contemporaneously herewith.
DATED this 30th day of October, 2008.

Motion for URCP 60(a) Correction of Entry of Default @V

C^'^A^/yi_
SARAH H. YOUNG
Attorney for Defendant

VD27329100

050901063

pages: 2

MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOf
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
^th

I hereby certify that on the 30 day of October, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following:
Dennis L. Mangrum
7110 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

D
N ^

2

A

n "i

- - l->^ i uu

i

'•••••

Sarah H. Young (11301)
YOUNG, KESTER & PETF
Attorneys for Defendant
5532 Lillehammer, Ste. 104
Park City, Utah 84098
Telephone: (435) 649-7369
Facsimile: (435)649-0246
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR URCP 60(a)
CORRECTION OF ENTRY OF
DEFAULT

v.
MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant.

Case No. 050901063
Judge Collection

COMES NOW, the Defendant, Marmalade Square Condominium Homeowners
Association, by and through counsel, Sarah H. Young of Young, Kester and Petro, submits his
Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) Correction of
Entry of Default, filed October 28 th , 2008. In support hereof, the Defendant states and alleges as
follows:
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

This matter was scheduled for trial on October 28, 2008.

2.

The parties were sent notice of the trial on July 29, 2008.

VD27329106
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3.

Notice was sent to Dennis Mangrum at his correct address, 7110 Highland Dr.,

Salt Lake City5 Utah 84121.
4.

The Notice stated "Non-Appearance of Counsel or parties may result in ... a

default entered."
5.

On October 28, 2008, the Defendant and Defendant's counsel appeared at trial.

6.

Neither the Plaintiff nor the Plaintiffs counsel was present.

7.

The Court informed Defendant's counsel that it would enter default because the

opposing party was not present, and informed Defendant's counsel they were free to leave. The
Defendant's appearance was not made on the record, and the Court's representation was not
stated on the record, because the Court was in the midst of another trial while this occurred.
8.

Later on October 28, 2008, Defendant's counsel received a minute entry stating

that the Court had entered default against the Defendant. The minute entry wrongly stated that
Plaintiffs counsel, Dennis Mangrum, had appeared that morning, and that the Defendant was not
present.
ARGUMENT
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a) states that "[clerical mistakes in ... orders ... may be
corrected by the court at any time ... on the motion of any party...."
The Minute Entry entered by the Court on October 28, 2008, erroneously states that
Dennis Mangrum was present at the October 28, 2008 trial, and that the Defendant failed to
appear. In fact, Defendant's counsel, Sarah H. Young was present, along with co-counsel, Allen
K. Young, Bruce Manka representative for Defendant Homeowners Association, and Defense

Witness Amanda Paddock. Neither Dennis Mangrum nor any representative for the Plaintiff was
present. The Court communicated with Mrs. Young through its bailiff that because the other
party was not present, the Court would enter default, and that therefore they were free to leave.
Defendant's counsel discovered later that default was incorrectly entered against the
Defense, rather than against the Plaintiff who had failed to appear. The Defendant respectfully
requests that the entry of default against the Defendant be corrected to reflect the Plaintiffs
failure to appear at the trial scheduled on October 28, 2008.
DATED this 30th day of October, 2008.

s
SARAH H. YO
Attorney for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the 30th day of October, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following:
Dennis L. Mangrum
7110 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
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Sarah H.Young (11301)
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
Attorneys for Defendant
5532 Lillehammer, Ste. 104
Park City, Utah 84098
Telephone: (435) 6 49-7369
Facsimile: (435) 649-0246
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 S. State, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENSE COUNSEL
SARAH H. YOUNG IN SUPPORT OF
60(a) MOTION FOR CORRECTION OF
ENTRY OF DEFAULT

v.
MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant.

Case No. 050901063
Judge Collection

SARAH H. YOUNG, Attorney for Defendant, having been first duly sworn, under oath,
deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the attorney for the Defendant in this matter.

2.

I am at least 18 years of age. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the

State of Utah. My bar number is 11301.
3.

The trial in this matter was scheduled for trial on October 28, 2008.

4.

The parties were sent notice of the trial on July 29, 2008.

5.

No further notices have been sent out.

!2S!?il
VD27356138
n^AOAinfi.l

pages: 8

MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOf

6.

The notice was sent to me, and I received it. It was also sent to Dennis Mangrum

at his correct address, 7110 Highland Dr., Salt Lake City, Utah 84121. See Exhibit A.
7.

The Notice stated "Non-Appearance of Counsel or parties may result in ... a

default entered/'
8.

On October 28, 2008, I appeared for trial at the correct courtroom, N41, at 9:15

am, 15 minutes early.
9.

I arrived with co-counsel, Allen K. Young, and with a representative for the

Defendant Corporation, Bruce Manka. Also present was the Defense witness, Amanda Paddock.
10.

My appearance was not stated on the record, because the Court was busy

conducting another trial at the time. The Court's bailiff approached me and, after I presented
him with our notice of trial, attached as Exhibit A, the bailiff confirmed that our trial was
scheduled on October 28, 2008 at 9:30 am in Courtroom N41. He asked me to attempt to meet
with Plaintiffs counsel prior to trial to resolve as many issues as possible, and stated that the
Court would try to hear our trial.
11.

I waited for Plaintiffs counsel to appear, and neither Plaintiffs counsel nor the

Plaintiff appeared for trial.
12.

After the Court and the Defense waited for approximately 10-15 minutes, the

Court informed Defense counsel through the bailiff that the Defense could leave, and that the
Court would enter default based on the Plaintiffs failure to appear.
13.

After inquiry from me through the bailiff, the Court asked me to file a request for

attorney's fees to accompany my default paperwork.
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14.

None of the Court's nor my representations or appearances were made on the

record, due to the trial that was being conducted at the time.
15.

When I returned to my office, I received a minute entry that erroneously entered a

default against my client, stating that neither me nor my client had appeared, and that Dennis
Mangrum had been present at our trial that morning.
16.

I state these facts and the foregoing voluntarily and of my own personal

knowledge.

SARAH H. YOl
Attorney for Defdntiant
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SUMMIT

)
) :ss
)

SARAH H. YOUNG, Attorney for Defendant, is personally known to me or presented
satisfactory proof of identity to me. After being sworn and while under oath he/she stated that
he/she was acting voluntarily, had read and understood the preceding document, and that the
contents were true. He/She then signed the document in my presence.
DATED this 31st day of October, 2008.

NOTARY PUBLIC
AMANDA LEK3H PADDOCK

,^/^r^NJy/|lA^(foU(^

576022

Notary Public

COMMISSION EXPIRES
08/06/2012
STATE OF UTAH
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this October 31, 2008, I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following:
Dennis L. Mangrum
7110 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

^jficUflcJg.
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EXHIBIT A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
NOTICE OF
BENCH TRIAL

CHEAP O ROOTER,
Plaintiff,

\Z£&CAr^WU£^

vs.

Case No: 050901063 DC

MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM H,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

JUDGE COLLECTION
July 29,2008

BENCH TRIAL.
Date: 10/28/2008
Time: 09:30 a.m.
Location: Fourth Floor - N41
THIRD DISTRICT COURT
4 50 SOUTH STATE
SLC, UT 84114-1860
Before Judge: JUDGE COLLECTION
The reason for the change is Court Ordered
THIS BENCH TRIAL WILL NOT BE CONTINUED WITHOUT THE WRITTEN
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AND/OR WITHOUT THE JUDGE'S APPROVAL.
UNAVAILABILITY OR NON-APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL OR PARTIES MAY RESULT
IN DATES BEING SET WITHOUT COUNSELS INPUT, PLEADINGS MAY BE
STRICKEN, COMPLAINT DISMISSED OR A DEFAULT ENTERED.
Please call Carol @ 238-7388 with any scheduling conflicts. The
responsibility of contacting the other party(ies) is that of the
party requesting the change.
Dated this ffi*day of

/OLAX^J

20 £>f)

*r

District Court Dep'
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Case No: 050901063
Date:
Jul 29, 2008
The Court will provide interpreters for criminal cases and domestic
violence cases involving protective orders or stalking injunctions.
(Fees in criminal cases may be imposed at the judge's discretion.)
IF YOU NEED AN INTERPRETER IN A CRIMINAL CASE OR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
CASE PLEASE NOTIFY THE COURT at 23 8-733 8 (five days before the
hearing, if possible).
FOR ALL OTHER CASES, you must bring someone with you to
interpret. If you do not know someone who can help you, the names
of court interpreters you can hire are listed on the courts1
website athttp://www.utcourts.gov/resources/interp/certified.html.
If you do not have access to the internet, ask the court clerk to
print off a copy of this list for you.
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, individuals
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary communicative
aids and services) should call Third District Court-Salt Lake at
23 8-7500 at least three working days prior to the proceeding. (For
TTY service call Utah Relay at 1-800-346-4128 or 711)

Page 2

Case No: 050901063
Date:
Jul 29, 2008
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 050901063 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

Of

^)u/lU

NAME
DENNIS L MANGRUM •
Attorney PLA
7110 HIGHLAND DR
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121
SARAH H YOUNG
Attorney DEF
1781 SIDEWINDER DR STE 2 00
PARK CITY UT 84060
/ 2v£Fb
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Addendum
Exhibit "D"
Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Default

34

NDV-03-200B WON 04:22 PM

"NNIS MANGRUM

FAX No. 8 0 '

H44

P. 002

W L » DISTRICT COURT

DENNIS L. MANGRUM #3687
Attorneys for Plaintiff
7110 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
(801)943-8107
(801) 9434744 (Fax)

Third Judicial District

NOV - 3 2008
SALT LAKE COUNTY
By.
0«pUtyCI«*

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
430 South State St, Salt Lake City, Ut 84111; 801.238-7800

CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah
Corporation.

MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT
AND SET NEW TRIAL DATE

Plaintiff,
OV1LNO.-.050901063

VB

MARMALADE SQUARE
CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, a UtahCorporatkm
Defendant

Judge:

DEBT COLLECTION

NOW COMES Plaintiff files this Motion to set aside the default of the Plaintiff
and schedule a new trial date.
The plaintiff believed that the trial date was November 14,2008, and has prepared
for that date. It appears that the trial date was originally set for November 14,2008, and
then changed to October 14,2008, and then changed again to October 28,2008. The
Plaintiff believed the trial was set for November 14,2008. The Plaintiff did not receive a
phone call or any kind of notice on October 28,2008, that the trial was proceeding and
the Defendants attorney knew the Plaintiff was ready for trial as exhibits and witness lists
had been mailed only weeks earlier.
The Plaintiff believes that the changes in setting of the trial dates caused the

Motion to Set Aside Default and Set New Trial Date (faxec
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MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOI

-03-2008 MON 04:22 PM

FAX No. 80!?

KIS WANGRUM

U4

confusion and is the reason the Plaintiff did not appear on October 2 8 , 2 0 0 8 . T h e
Plaintiff has i t ' s case prepared and witness ready for trial on N o v e m b e r 2 8 , 2 0 0 8 .

Dennis L. Man]
Attorney for Plaini

C E R T I F I C A T E O F MAILING

I hereby certify that on the j i . day of hic\\.
. 2008,1 served the foregoing Motion
to set aside the default, by: 0 depositing copies thereof in the United States mail, postage
prepaid, addressed as follows, or by (x)FAXING copies to the numbers listed below:
Sarah H. Young
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
5532 Lillchammer Lane No. 104
Park City, Utah 84098
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Addendum
Exhibit "E"
Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiffs Motion to Set Aside Default
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Sarah H.Young (ll 301)
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO

' '

- - ,•'

Attorneys for Defendant
5532 Lillehammer, Ste. 104
Park City, Utah 84098
Telephone: (435) 649-7369
Facsimile: (435) 649-0246
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
450 S. State, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114

CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

vs.
MARMALADE SQUARE
CONDOMINIUM HOMEOWNERS
ASSOCIATION, a Utah Corporation,
BRUCE MANKA and FRANK GUYMAN
Defendants.

]
i
]>
I
;)
]>
]1
]
]

DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO THE PLAINTIFF'S
RULE 60(b) MOTION TO SET ASIDE
DEFAULT
Case No. 050901063 DC
Judge: CJ

]

The Defendants, Marmalade Square Condominium Homeowners Association and Bruce
Manka, by and through their counsel submit the following memorandum in opposition to the
Plaintiff s motion to set aside the default entered by the Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

On July 22,2008, this matter was originally set for trial on November 14, 2008.

2.

The Court docket will reflect that on July 25, 2008, the Court sent a correcting
Deft's memorandum in opposition io the pltf s rule 60(1

VD27466285
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notice to the parties changing the trial date from November 14, 2008 at 9:30 a.m. to the same
time on October 14, 2008.
3.

On July 29 and 30, 2008, as a result of a conference call with the Court and the

two counsel, the trial date was changed to October 28, 2008, at 9:20 a.m., a date and time cleared
with the offices of both counsel.
4.

Counsel for the Plaintiff prepared a pretrial order and submitted notice of the

witnesses and exhibits that he intended to use at the time of trial. Likewise, counsel for the
Defendants submitted the required filings.
5.

On the day of trial, the Defendants and their counsel were present and prepared

for trial. The Plaintiff did not appear in person or by counsel.
6.

The court has erroneously entered the default of the Defendants as opposed to

entering of the default of the Plaintiff, who failed to appear. Counsel for the Defendants has
submitted a Rule 60(a) motion to correct the clerical error.
7.

Neither Plaintiff nor its counsel, in its motion for Rule 60(b) relief, has provided

the Court with any basis cognizable under Rule 60(b), to justify relieving the Plaintiff from the
consequences of its failure to appear at trial.
8.

This case was filed on January 19, 2005 and therefore has been pending for over

three- and-one-half years. The case has already produced one notice from the Court of its intent
to dismiss for failure to prosecute.
ARGUMENT
2

POINT I:
ONLY THE DEMONSTRATION OF A TIMELY APPLICATION, PROPER
GROUNDS AND A DEFENSE ON THE MERITS JUSTIFIES
THE SETTING ASIDE OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT.
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides in relevant part as follows:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the furtherance of
justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect. . . . The motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for
reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. . . The procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independent
action.
As established by the Utah Supreme Court in Erichon v. Schenkers, 882 P.2d 1147 (Utah
1994), the Court held that in order to prevail on a motion to set aside a default judgment, the
moving party must establish 1) that the motion seeking relief was timely filed (within three
months); 2) that a basis for the relief has been established under the Rule (mistake, inadvertence
or excusable neglect); and 3) that the party against whom the default has been entered has a
meritorious defense on the merits. Id. See also, Hernandez v. Baker, 104 P.3d 664 (Utah App.
2004); Black's Title, Inc., 991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999); and Lund v. Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah
2000).
The Utah Court of Appeals has held that "[t]o demonstrate that the default was due to
excusable neglect, f[t]he movant must show that he has used due diligence and that he was
prevented from appearing by circumstances over which he had no control.n, Black's Title, Inc.,
i

991 P.2d 607 (Utah App. 1999) (quoting Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65,
513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)) (alteration in original) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court has
defined "excusable neglect" as "the exercise of 'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person
under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah
1987) (citing Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)).
In Erickson, the Court determined that a defense is sufficiently meritorious to have a
default judgment set aside if it is entitled to be tried. Id.
POINT II:
THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS TO ALLOW
THIS COURT TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT,
In applying the law to the facts of this case, it is respectfully submitted that the Plaintiff
has failed to comply with the critical requirements of the Rule. The only element that the Plaintiff
has met is the time requirement. Plaintiff filed its motion for relief within three months of the
entry of the default judgment in this case, which occurred on October 28, 2008.
The Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate a factual basis that falls within the Utah Supreme
Court's definition of "mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect." The trial date that was set in
this matter was established by counsel for the parties and the Court on a conference call. Notice
of the trial date was sent to the attorneys by the court. The parties acted in conformity with the
Court's instruction in filing a pretrial order and filing notices relating to witnesses and exhibits
that were to be used at trial. No effort was taken by the Plaintiff prior to the morning of trial to
obtain a continuance or otherwise modify the trial date and time. The Plaintiff does not contend
that the trial date was set without consulting its counsel and does not contend that it did not
receive notice of the trial. Further, if counsel for the Plaintiff acted in accordance with his
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responsibility, notice of the trial was both in the hands of counsel and the hands of the
representatives of the Plaintiff, who would have received a copy of the notice from counsel.
In Allred v. Allred, 2005 UT App 338 (2005), the district court entered judgment against
the defendant after he failed to appear at the scheduled trial and denied his motion for a new trial
and for relief from judgment under Utah R. Civ. P. 59 and 60. Id. The Utah Appellate Court found
that the district court mailed defendant a "notice of trial" which was signed by the district court
judge. The notice timely and adequately described the nature of the proceedings against him. The
Court of Appeals found that the district court's finding that defendant did not act with ordinary
prudence or as a result of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect was well supported.
Id.
In Masters v. LeSeuer, 13 Utah 2d 293, 373 P.2d 573 (1962), "the [defendant's] attorney
thought he had filed an answer but . . . he had mistakenly not done so." Id, at 573. The Utah
Supreme Court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting a default judgment
in favor of the plaintiff when the evidence was that "the attorney then representing the plaintiff
called the defendant's attorney's attention to the fact that the matter was in default and that a
default judgment would be taken unless something was done." Id.; see also Pacer Sport & Cycle,
Inc. v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1975) (finding no excusable neglect under rule 60 where
defendant "assumed the action had been taken care of and therefore took no steps to file an
answer to the complaint").
As noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has defined "excusable neglect" as "the exercise
of'due diligence' by a reasonably prudent person under similar circumstances." Mini Spas, Inc. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 733 P.2d 130, 132 (Utah 1987) (citing Airkem Intermountain, Inc. v. Parker,
30 Utah 2d 65, 513 P.2d 429, 431 (1973)). No one could argue that failing to appear, for no
5

reason, at trial in a case pending for over three years, when adequate notice was sent and received,
that had been set by stipulation, portrays due diligence.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the total absence of any facts that would demonstrate a basis under Rule
60(b), the Plaintiffs motion to set aside the default should be denied.
DATED this /^/day of November, 2008.

TS.fjhl/hai
Sarah H. Young, Esq.7/
Attorney for Defendam Marmalade

CERTIFICATE OF FAXING AND MAILING
I certify that a copy of the foregoing was faxed and mailed, postage prepaid to the
following by first class mail, on the jifoky of November, 2008.
Dennis L. Mangrum, Esq.
7110 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

AfwiiAclnrarlcl^
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Default

050901063

Sarah H.Young (11301)
YOUNG, KESTER & PETRO
Attorneys for Defendant
5532 Lillehamrner, Ste. 104
Park City, Utah 84098
Telephone: (435) 649-7369
Facsimile: (435) 649-0246

MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOt

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC 2 2 2008
SALT LAKE COUNTY

DMUtyClwK

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

CHEAP-O-ROOTER, INC., a Utah
Corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER CORRECTING ENTRY OF
DEFAULT

^Af^^JeA b<^
Z-fo/ol /Wi'wh^- < ^ « ^

v.
MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Utah
Corporation,
Defendant.

Case No. 050901063
Judge Collection

This matter came on regularly before the Court on Defendant's Motion for 60(a)
Correction of the Entry of Default entered against the Defendant on October 28, 2008. The Court
finds that the Defendant and Defendant's counsel appeared for trial on October 28, 2008, and
that both .the Plaintiff and Plaintiffs counsel failed to appear. The Court, therefore, for good
cause appearing, having reviewed the pleadings on the file, and being fully advised in the
premises, and hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES, and DECREES as follows:
ORDER
1.

The Court hereby relieves the Defendant from the default entered on October 28,

2008 against the Defendant.

2.

The Court hereby enters the default of the Plaintiff, who failed to appear for trial

on October 28,2008.
DATED this l^k

day of

ffc>CCz^vt&~

2008

RULE 7 NOTICE
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant has submitted the
above and foregoing Order to the Court for signature. Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, any objection to the form of the Order should be filed with the Court within
five days after service upon you of this notice.
DATED this 30th day of October, 2008

SARAH H. YOlMG

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 30 day of October, 2008,1 mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing, postage prepaid, to the following:
Dennis L. Mangrum
7110 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

d Pnrtriorb

Addendum
Exhibit "G"
Minute Entry Setting Aside Plaintiffs
Default
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i .JED DISTRICT COuHT
Third Judicial District

FEB - 4 2009
py

SALT LAKt COUNTY
^

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHEAP 0 ROOTER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:
: MINUTE ENTRY
:

Case No: 050901063

MARMALADE SQUARE CONDOMINIUM H, : Judge: JUDGE COLLECTION
Defendant.
: Date:
February 4, 2009

This case came before the court for consideration of Defendant's
Motion for Correction of Entry of Default and Plaintiff's Motion to
Set Aside Default and Set New Trial Date.
After review of the
file and pleadings therein, the court rules that the default of
any party previously entered is hereby Set Aside. The clerk is
directed to set this case for a PreTrial Conference, so that
settlement discussions may be effected and/or a mutually-acceptable
date for a new Bench Trial may be set. This minute entry is the
order of the court on this issue; no further order is required.

Case No: 050901063
Date:
Feb 04, 2009
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 050901063 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

NAME
DENNIS L MANGRUM
Attorney PLA
7110 HIGHLAND DR
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121
SARAH H YOUNG
Attorney DEF
5532 LILLEHAMMER LN STE 104
PARK CITY UT 84098
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